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Sterling financial markets
Overview
Financial market sentiment and functioning continued to
deteriorate over the review period amid intensifying concerns
about a potentially disorderly resolution to the fiscal
challenges and external imbalances facing several euro-area
countries, related banking sector vulnerabilities and the
macroeconomic outlook.
Fiscal developments remained a key influence on financial
markets.  In the euro area, concerns about the sustainability of
fiscal and external positions and the implications for banking
sectors intensified, leading to strains within financial markets.
On 27 October, the European authorities announced a package
of measures designed to address those concerns.  These
measures only provided temporary respite to financial markets,
with spreads between the yields of sovereign bonds of several
euro-area countries and those of German government bonds
rising to levels last experienced prior to the launch of the euro
in 1999 (Chart 1).  These developments continued to interact
with, and were compounded by, concerns about the
sustainability of the global economic recovery.
Against this backdrop, most primary capital markets continued
to experience low levels of activity as investors sought to
reduce their exposures to risky assets.  This contributed to a
further deterioration in bank funding conditions.
Policymakers in the United Kingdom and abroad reacted to the
deteriorating macroeconomic outlook by easing monetary
policy.  Subsequent to the review period a range of policy
measures was announced to support financial stability.  A
number of central banks, including the Bank, announced
co-ordinated actions to enhance their capacity to provide
liquidity support in overseas currencies.  The Bank also
announced a new contingency sterling liquidity facility — the
Extended Collateral Term Repo Facility.  And the Bank’s
Financial Policy Committee agreed recommendations to
mitigate risks to financial stability in the current
environment.(2) On 8–9 December, European leaders met to
discuss new measures to address the ongoing challenges facing
the euro area.
Monetary policy and short-term interest rates
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee maintained
Bank Rate at 0.5% and voted on 6 October to increase the size
of its asset purchase programme, financed by the issuance of
central bank reserves, by £75 billion to a total of £275 billion.
The Committee judged that the deterioration in the economic
outlook had made it more likely that inflation would
undershoot the 2% target in the medium term without further
monetary stimulus.  The asset purchase programme is
described in the box on pages 282–83.
A Reuters poll of economists released after the end of the
review period showed that all respondents expected further
asset purchases, with a median expectation of £75 billion.
Respondents expected an extension to the programme to be
announced in 2012 Q1.  The same poll indicated that
expectations of the first rise in Bank Rate continued to be
pushed further into the future;  the median expectation was
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(a) Spreads over ten-year German government bond yields.
Chart 1 Selected European ten-year government bond
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for no increase in Bank Rate over the survey horizon, which
ended in the middle of 2013.  Consistent with this, forward
sterling overnight index swap (OIS) rates fell at longer
maturities (Chart 2).
At the very short end of the money market curve, sterling
unsecured overnight interest rates traded slightly above
Bank Rate during the review period, with a notable spike at
the end of September (Chart 3).  Contacts attributed this to
banks’ reluctance to lend on an unsecured basis at the end of
a reporting period.
Having traded above Bank Rate for much of 2011, sterling
secured overnight interest rates fell below Bank Rate towards
the end of the review period (Chart 3).  Contacts noted that
one contributing factor had been cash lenders increasingly
seeking the protection provided by lending secured against
high-quality collateral in response to ongoing developments in
the euro area.  This had increased the demand on the pool of
available collateral, enabling borrowers who could provide that
collateral to borrow at lower interest rates.  Contacts noted a
number of reasons, including banks’ reluctance to increase the
size of their balance sheets, as to why borrowers with access to
reserves accounts at the Bank had not fully exploited the
opportunity to borrow cash secured and deposit it on their
reserves account at Bank Rate.
Elsewhere, on 3 November, the Governing Council of the
European Central Bank (ECB) decided to cut its main policy
rate by 25 basis points to 1.25%.  In October, the ECB had
announced a second programme of covered bonds purchases
totalling €40 billion to contribute to easing funding
conditions for credit institutions and enterprises.  The ECB also
extended its liquidity provision to euro-area banks with the
introduction of two longer-term refinancing operations.
Purchases of debt securities continued under the Securities
Markets Programme.
In the United States, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) decided at its meeting in mid-September to extend
the average maturity of its holdings of securities by
announcing a programme to sell US$400 billion of
shorter-term Treasury securities and use the proceeds to buy
longer-term Treasury securities.  The FOMC also announced
that it would reinvest principal payments from its holdings of
agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency
mortgage-backed securities.
Long-term interest rates
Over the review period, concerns about the sustainability of
several euro-area countries’ fiscal and external positions
intensified, and spread beyond the most vulnerable Member
States to previously less-affected countries.  These concerns
were reflected in the further widening of the spread between
the sovereign bond yields of a number of euro-area countries
and those of Germany (Chart 1).  On 27 October, the European
authorities announced a package of measures designed to
address those concerns.  But these measures only temporarily
alleviated some of the tensions in financial markets.
According to contacts, investors sought refuge in sovereign
bonds that were perceived as more liquid and/or safer,
including those of the United States and the United Kingdom.
Contacts thought that this, together with the lowering of
policy rate expectations, had contributed to US and
UK government bond yields falling across much of the yield
curve (Chart 4).
In the United Kingdom, the expansion of the asset purchase
programme also contributed to the fall in gilt yields.  But
contacts noted that it was difficult to disentangle this from
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(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s OIS curves.





















(a) Spread of weighted average unsecured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
(b) Spread of weighted average secured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
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Asset purchases(1)
On 6 October, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted
to increase the size of its asset purchase programme, financed
by the issuance of central bank reserves, by £75 billion to
£275 billion.(2) The MPC agreed that the asset purchases
would be of conventional gilts, conducted over a four-month
period, and spread evenly across residual maturities over
three years.  As of 24 November, outstanding asset purchases
financed by issuance of central bank reserves — in terms of the
amount paid to sellers — were £235 billion.
Purchases of high-quality private sector assets financed by the
issuance of Treasury bills and the Debt Management Office’s
(DMO’s) cash management operations continued, in line with
the arrangements announced on 29 January 2009.(3)
Table 1 summarises asset purchases by type of asset.
Gilts
Following the MPC’s decision on 6 October to purchase an
additional £75 billion of gilts over the subsequent four months,
the Bank announced that gilt purchases would resume on
10 October, and that the Bank would normally offer to
purchase conventional gilts with a residual maturity of
3–10 years on Mondays, of greater than 25 years on Tuesdays
and of 10–25 years on Wednesdays.  The Bank further
announced that the size of the auctions would initially be
£1.7 billion, although the scale of the programme would be
kept under review by the MPC, and that the range of gilts
eligible for purchase would remain unchanged.
As of 24 November, the Bank had purchased £35.7 billion in
terms of the amount paid to sellers, split equally across the
three maturity buckets.  The total amount of gilts purchased
since the start of the asset purchase programme in
March 2009 in terms of the amount paid to sellers was
£234 billion, of which £98.6 billion of purchases had been
undertaken in the 3–10 year residual maturity range,
£98.2 billion in the 10–25 year residual maturity range and
£37.2 billion with a residual maturity greater than 25 years
(Chart A).
Cover in the auctions varied, but averaged 3.2 in the 3–10 year
auctions, 2.2 in the 10–25 year auctions and 1.6 in the auctions
for gilts with a maturity greater than 25 years.(4)
In line with previous Asset Purchase Facility (APF) gilt
purchases, the Bank continued to exclude gilts in which the
Bank holds a large proportion (more than 70%) of the free
float (the total issue size of the gilt minus government
holdings).(5)
Gilt lending facility(6)
The Bank continued to offer to lend some of its gilt holdings
via the DMO in return for other UK government collateral.  In
Table 1 Asset Purchase Facility transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial Secured commercial Gilts Corporate bond Total(b)
paper paper Purchases Sales
25 August 2011(c)(d) 0 30 198,275 1,115 199,420
1 September 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 September 2011 0 0 0 15 18 -3
15 September 2011 0 0 0 9 0 9
22 September 2011 0 25 0 9 51 -17
29 September 2011 0 0 0 3 0 3
6 October 2011 0 0 0 9 3 6
13 October 2011 0 0 5,100 22 11 5,111
20 October 2011 0 0 5,100 0 28 5,072
27 October 2011 0 20 5,100 0 42 5,078
3 November 2011 0 0 5,100 0 131 4,969
10 November 2011 0 0 5,100 2 54 5,048
17 November 2011 0 0 5,100 16 0 5,116
24 November 2011 0 0 5,100 9 7 5,102
Total financed by a deposit from the DMO(d)(e) – 20 – 195 215
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) – – 233,973 667 234,640
Total asset purchases(d)(e) – 20 233,973 862 234,855
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to the
nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Measured as amount outstanding as at 25 August 2011.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 283
the three months to 30 September 2011, a daily average of
£2,623 million of gilts was lent as part of the gilt lending
facility.  This was broadly in line with the average of
£2,371 million in the previous quarter.
Corporate bonds
The Bank continued to offer to purchase and sell corporate
bonds via the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme, with
purchases financed by the issue of Treasury bills and the DMO’s
cash management operations.  The Scheme continues to serve
a useful role as a backstop, particularly during periods of
market uncertainty.
Sales of corporate bonds increased during the review period,
with the Bank being a net seller of corporate bonds.  As of
24 November the Bank’s portfolio totalled £862 million,
compared to £1,115 million at the end of the previous review
period.  The increase in net sales reflected a small number of
larger sale operations, including the largest amount sold
since the start of the Scheme on 28 October (£131 million).
Contacts attributed the larger sale operations to market
makers being less willing to hold inventory of corporate
bonds in current volatile conditions, and using Bank
operations to source corporate bonds in response to
end-investor demand.
Commercial paper
The commercial paper (CP) facility remained unused over the
review period.  It closed on 15 November 2011, in line with the
Bank’s provision of twelve months’ notice of its intention to
withdraw this scheme on 15 November 2010, reflecting a
sustained improvement in the sterling commercial paper
market.
Average spreads on sterling-denominated CP over the review
period were broadly stable and remain well below the levels
seen in early 2009.
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.(7) The Bank
announced on 15 November 2010 that it had made a
programme eligible for this facility.  This programme has
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(a) Proceeds paid to counterparties on a settled basis.
(b) Residual maturity as at the date of purchase.
Chart A Cumulative gilt purchases(a) by residual
maturity(b)
(1) The data cut-off for this box is 24 November 2011, unless otherwise stated.  For
further discussion on asset purchases see the Asset Purchase Facility Quarterly Report
available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/markets/apf/quarterlyreport.htm.
(2) For further information, see the 6 October Market Notice, available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice111006.pdf.
(3) The APF was initially authorised to purchase private sector assets financed by
Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management operations.  Its remit was extended
to enable the Facility to be used as a monetary policy tool on 3 March 2009.  All
purchases of assets between 6 March 2009 and 4 February 2010 were financed by
central bank reserves.  All purchases of private sector assets since 4 February 2010
have been financed by the issuance of Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management
operations.  All purchases of gilts since 10 October 2011 have been financed by central
bank reserves.  The Chancellor’s letter is available at 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/chx_letter_061011.pdf.
(4) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
(5) The 8% 2021 gilt was excluded from all operations over the period for this reason.
(6) For more details on the gilt lending facility see the box ‘Gilt lending facility’ in the
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 4, page 253.
(7) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.284 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
The fall in nominal gilt yields reflected changes in both real
yields and breakeven inflation rates.  Forward real interest
rates fell across the yield curve, with negative forward yields
extending to horizons out to five years (Chart 5).  Having
fallen earlier in the review period, medium-term breakeven
inflation rates — derived as the difference in the yield of
conventional and index-linked gilts — ended the period little
changed (Chart 6).  A comparable measure of implied inflation
derived from inflation swaps — which contacts noted was less
affected by factors specific to the gilt market — was little
changed throughout the review period.
Bank funding markets
Bank funding market conditions continued to deteriorate over
the review period, with strains in both short-term and
longer-term public funding markets.  Contacts attributed this
largely to the implications that euro-area fiscal developments
might have for banking sector balance sheets, through both
direct and indirect sovereign debt exposures.
Short-term interbank funding markets became harder to
access with tenors falling and investors differentiating more
between institutions.  The spread of average short-term
interbank borrowing rates across banks relative to OIS rates
rose across the major currencies (Chart 7).  The spread was
highest for the euro, which contacts attributed to the relative
vulnerability of euro-area banks to the fiscal challenges and
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Chart 6 UK implied five-year RPI inflation rate,
five years forward
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Three-month Libor-OIS spreads derived from Libor fixings and OIS rates.
(b) Forward spreads derived using data as at 25 November.  The squares are implied forward
spreads using forward Libors derived from forward rate agreements, and forward OIS rates
derived from the OIS curve.
Chart 7 International three-month spot and forward
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external imbalances facing several euro-area countries.
Forward spreads implied by derivatives settling on Libor
remained consistent with market participants anticipating that
short-term bank funding costs would remain elevated in the
months ahead.  Both spot and forward Libor-OIS spreads
remained, however, well below the levels reached in late 2008.
For some European banks, funding conditions were
particularly strained in US dollar markets.  The difference
between the cost of raising US dollar funding by borrowing in
euro and swapping via the foreign exchange market and the
cost of direct US dollar borrowing rose sharply, to around
150 basis points (Chart 8).  At the same time, US money
market mutual funds cut exposures to European banks and
reduced the average maturity of remaining funding.
On 15 September, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss
National Bank announced additional US dollar liquidity
provision operations.  After the cut-off date for this article, this
was supplemented by a range of measures that were
announced as part of co-ordinated central bank action to
address pressures in global money markets.  These measures
are described in more detail in the box on pages 286–88.
Conditions in longer-term unsecured debt markets remained
difficult for the major UK banks, with only sporadic issuance in
September, a traditionally busy month for bank funding.
Contacts attributed this to the increasing concern about the
implications for banks of the ongoing challenges facing
several euro-area countries.  While a few higher-rated
European banks did issue senior unsecured term debt, they
typically had to pay rates above those for similar, and often
larger, transactions in 2010.  Contacts reported that they
expected the cost of unsecured funding to remain elevated for
the foreseeable future.  There was greater activity in secured
term funding markets, with several UK banks accessing the
market.  But total public unsecured and secured issuance
during the review period was well below levels seen earlier in
the year (Chart 9).
At the end of the review period, the major UK banks were
already very close to meeting their wholesale term funding
targets for 2011, following strong issuance in the first half of
the year.  But contacts noted that pre-funding for 2012 had
been difficult in the prevailing climate, with some banks
expected to rely more on secured markets.
Major UK and continental European banks’ credit default swap
(CDS) premia — one indicator of longer-term wholesale
funding costs — rose sharply over the review period, reaching
historically high levels (Chart 10).  US banks’ CDS premia also
rose over the review period, reaching their highest levels since
early 2009, but remained below the levels that prevailed at
the time of the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Corporate capital markets
Equity prices were volatile during the review period, but the
FTSE All-Share index ended the period little changed.  Contacts
thought that movements in equity prices mainly reflected
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Sources:  British Bankers’ Association, Reuters and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of three-month US dollar Libor implied from foreign exchange forwards over actual
three-month US dollar Libor.  For more details on the construction of these measures, see
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 2, page 134, Chart 26 and BIS Quarterly
Review, March 2008, pages 73–86.
Chart 8 Spread of foreign exchange implied cost of























Sources:  Bank of England, Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a) Includes debt issued by Banco Santander, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Co-operative Financial
Services, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, National Australia Bank, Nationwide, Northern Rock
and Royal Bank of Scotland.  Term issuance refers here to securities with an original
contractual maturity or earliest call date of at least 18 months.  It includes subordinated
lower Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital instruments with debt features.
(b) Senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
(c) Medium-term notes.
(d) Asset-backed securities.
(e) Commercial mortgage-backed securities.
(f) Residential mortgage-backed securities.
(g) Data are up to 25 November 2011.
Chart 9 Term issuance by the major UK lenders in
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Operations within the sterling monetary
framework and other market operations
The level of reserves continued to be determined by (i) the
stock of reserves injected via the Asset Purchase Facility (APF),
(ii) the level of reserves supplied by long-term repo open
market operations (OMOs) and (iii) the net impact of other
sterling (‘autonomous factor’) flows across the Bank’s balance
sheet.  This box describes the Bank’s operations within the
sterling monetary framework over the review period, and other
market operations.  The box on pages 282–83 provides more
detail on the APF.
Operational Standing Facilities
Since 5 March 2009, the rate paid on the Operational Standing
Deposit Facility has been zero, while all reserves account
balances have been remunerated at Bank Rate.  Reflecting this,
average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each of the
maintenance periods under review.  Average use of the lending
facility was also £0 million throughout the period.
Indexed long-term repo OMOs
As part of its provision of liquidity insurance to the banking
system, the Bank conducts indexed long-term repo (ILTR)
operations.  The Bank offers reserves via ILTRs once each
calendar month;  typically, the Bank will conduct two
operations with a three-month maturity and one operation
with a six-month maturity in each calendar quarter.
Participants are able to borrow against two different sets of
collateral.  One set corresponds with securities eligible in the
Bank’s short-term repo operations (‘narrow collateral’), and
the other set contains a broader class of high-quality debt
securities that, in the Bank’s judgement, trade in liquid markets
(‘wider collateral’).
The Bank offered £5 billion via three-month ILTR operations on
both 13 September and 11 October, and £2.5 billion via a
six-month operation on 15 November (Table 1).
The stop-out spread — the difference between clearing
spreads for wider and narrow collateral — is an indicator of
potential stress in the market.  It reached a new high for
three-month operations in the September ILTR, rising to
30 basis points.  It subsequently fell to 23 basis points in the
October operation, a level slightly higher than the average in
previous three-month operations.  The cover ratio — also a
potential indicator of stress in the market — rose, from 0.96 in
September, to 1.64 in October, the highest cover ratio in any
three-month ILTR operation to date (Chart A).  The elevated
stop-out spread in the September operation, and the higher
cover in the October operation, were consistent with an
increase in the demand for three-month funding in the ILTR,
consistent with a worsening in financial market sentiment.
In contrast, the six-month operation in November recorded
the lowest cover in any operation to date (0.51), and a
below-average stop-out spread relative to other six-month
ILTR operations, at 25 basis points.  Although the operation
coincided with elevated market stress, the results were not
indicative of heightened demand for six-month liquidity via
the ILTR.
Table 1 Indexed long-term repo operations
Total Collateral set summary
Narrow Wider
13 September 2011 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 4,803 3,245 1,558
Amount allocated (£ millions) 4,203 3,245 958
Cover 0.96 0.65 0.31
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 30
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 30
11 October 2011 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 8,220 6,955 1,265
Amount allocated (£ millions) 5,000 4,185 815
Cover 1.64 1.39 0.25
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 23
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 23
15 November 2011 (six-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 2,500
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 1,268 760 508
Amount allocated (£ millions) 1,170 760 410
Cover 0.51 0.30 0.20
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 25
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 25
(a) Due to the treatment of paired bids, the sum of bids received by collateral set may not equal total bids
received.
(b) Difference between clearing spreads for wider and narrow collateral.
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Reserves provided via ILTRs during the review period were
more than offset by the maturity of the previous ILTR
operations.  Consequently, the stock of liquidity provided
through longer-term operations declined.
Discount Window Facility
The Discount Window Facility (DWF) provides liquidity
insurance to the banking system by allowing eligible banks to
borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral.  On 4 October
2011, the Bank announced that the average daily amount
outstanding in the 30-day DWF between 1 April and 30 June
2011 was £0 million.  The Bank also announced that the
average daily amount outstanding in the 364-day DWF
between 1 April and 30 June 2010 was £0 million.
Extended Collateral Term Repo Facility
After the end of the review period, on 6 December 2011, the
Bank announced the introduction of a new contingency
liquidity facility, the Extended Collateral Term Repo (ECTR)
Facility.  The ECTR Facility is designed to mitigate risks to
financial stability arising from a market-wide shortage of
short-term sterling liquidity.  It gives the Bank additional
flexibility to offer sterling liquidity in an auction format against
the widest range of collateral.  Operations under the Facility
will be announced at the discretion of the Bank in response to
actual or prospective market-wide stress.  The operations
would offer sterling for 30 days against collateral
pre-positioned for use in the Bank’s DWF.  All firms registered
for access to the Bank’s DWF would be eligible for ECTR
operations.
The ECTR forms part of the sterling monetary framework and
has been reflected in an update to the Bank’s Red Book.(1)
Other operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) was introduced in
April 2008 to improve the liquidity position of the banking
system by allowing banks and building societies, for a limited
period, to swap their high-quality mortgage-backed and other
private sector securities for UK Treasury bills for up to
three years.  The Scheme was designed to finance part of the
overhang of illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets by
exchanging them temporarily for more easily tradable assets.
When the drawdown period for the SLS closed at the end of
January 2009, £185 billion of UK Treasury bills had been lent
under the SLS.  In order to prevent a refinancing ‘cliff’, the Bank
held bilateral discussions with all users of the Scheme to
ensure that there were funding plans in place to reduce their
use of the Scheme in a smooth fashion.  The impact of these
expected repayment plans are shown in aggregate in Chart B),
along with the repayment profile based on counterparties’
contractual repayment obligations, and the profile of actual
repayments to date.  Despite difficult market conditions,
participants continued to make repayments over the quarter:
by end-November 2011, £179 billion had been repaid,
compared with £168 billion at end-August 2011.
US dollar repo operations
From 11 May 2010 the Bank reintroduced weekly fixed-rate
tenders with a seven-day maturity to offer US dollar liquidity,
in co-ordination with other central banks, in response to
renewed strains in the short-term funding market for
US dollars at this time.  As of 25 November 2011, there had
been no use of the Bank’s facility.
On 15 September 2011, the Bank announced, in co-ordination
with the ECB, Swiss National Bank, the Federal Reserve, and
the Bank of Japan, that it would be conducting three US dollar
tenders, each at a term of approximately three months
covering the end of the year.  There was no use of the Bank’s
facility in the first two tenders on 12 October and 9 November.
After the end of the review period, the Bank announced, in
co-ordination with the Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, the ECB,
Swiss National Bank, and the Federal Reserve, that the
authorisation of the existing temporary US dollar swap
arrangements had been extended to 1 February 2013, and that
the 84-day US dollar tenders would continue until this time
and that the seven-day operations would continue until
further notice.  It also announced that the central banks had
agreed to lower the pricing on the US dollar swap
arrangements by 50 basis points so that the new rate would be
the US dollar overnight index swap rate plus 50 basis points
and that this pricing would be applied to all operations
conducted from 5 December 2011.  As a contingency measure,
the six central banks agreed to establish a network of
temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements so that
liquidity could be provided in each jurisdiction in any of their
currencies should market conditions so warrant.  These
bilateral swap lines will be available until 1 February 2013.
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around 5% below its level at the start of the review period
(Chart 11).  Some of the largest falls were in the financial
sector.  Contacts reported that perceptions of a deteriorating
macroeconomic outlook also weighed on equity prices more
generally.
Yields of investment-grade non-financial sterling and
US dollar-denominated corporate bonds were little changed
over the review period (Chart 12).  But their spreads relative to
sovereign bonds rose.  Contacts attributed this to euro-area
developments and market makers being less willing to hold
inventory in volatile markets.  Yields on investment-grade
non-financial euro-denominated corporate bonds rose, albeit
by less than sovereign bond yields.
Following muted activity over the summer, gross
investment-grade corporate bond issuance by UK private
non-financial corporations (PNFCs) picked up during the
review period, with contacts reporting investor appetite for
high-quality corporate bonds.  But new issue premia reached
Bank of England balance sheet:  capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, for example in the Bank for International
Settlements, and the Bank’s physical assets) and aggregate
cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
changes in investment policy.
The portfolio currently includes around £3.4 billion of gilts
and £0.5 billion of other debt securities.  Over the period
between 27 August 2011 and 25 November 2011, gilt
purchases were made in accordance with the quarterly
announcements on 1 July 2011 and 3 October 2011.
(1) Further details are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/ectr/index.htm.
















Sources:  Markit Group Limited and Bank calculations.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior CDS prices.
(b) Average of Banco Santander, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, UBS and UniCredit.
(c) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Morgan Stanley.
(d) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, Royal Bank of Scotland and
Santander UK.
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Indices are quoted in domestic currency terms, except for the MSCI Emerging Markets index,
which is quoted in US dollar terms.
(b) The MSCI Emerging Markets index is a capitalisation-weighted index that monitors the
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historically high levels despite yields in secondary markets
remaining low (Chart 12).  This made it harder for less
established issuers to come to the market.  There was
increased activity in the Bank’s Corporate Bond Secondary
Market Scheme (see the box on pages 282–83).
Net equity issuance remained negative, with August and
September share buybacks at the highest level since
January 2008 (Chart 13).  Contacts mainly attributed the
negative net issuance to the volatile conditions prevailing in
secondary markets.
Some contacts noted the emergence of new non-bank lenders
to corporates.  But small and medium-sized enterprises
without access to capital markets continued to have difficulty
raising finance.  After the end of the review period, in the
Autumn Statement, the Government announced a package of
interventions designed to ease the flow of credit to businesses
that do not have ready access to capital markets.
Foreign exchange
The sterling exchange rate index (ERI) has remained within a
relatively narrow range since early 2009.  Over the review
period, the sterling ERI appreciated slightly with sterling’s
appreciation against the euro more than offsetting its
depreciation against the US dollar on a trade-weighted basis
(Chart 14).
According to contacts, recent exchange rate movements have
been influenced by changes in risk premia, particularly for the
euro-sterling bilateral exchange rate.  Most market participants
thought that sterling’s appreciation against the euro over the
review period reflected the intensification of concerns around
the challenges facing some euro-area countries.
Information derived from option prices suggested that market
participants have placed a greater weight on sterling
appreciating.  According to these data, investors were willing
to pay a higher price to buy protection against an
unexpectedly large depreciation of the euro against sterling
(Chart 15).
Since the previous Bulletin, both the Bank of Japan and
Swiss National Bank have intervened in foreign exchange
markets to prevent their currencies from appreciating further.
Market intelligence on developments in
market structure
In discharging its responsibilities to maintain monetary
stability and contribute to financial stability, the Bank gathers
information from contacts across a wide spectrum of financial
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(a) Returns are defined as the logarithmic difference between the current forward rate and the
spot rate at the maturity date of the contract.
(b) The simplified sterling ERI places 70% weight on the euro-sterling bilateral exchange rate and
30% weight on the US dollar-sterling bilateral exchange rate.
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markets.  This intelligence helps inform the Bank’s assessment
of monetary conditions and possible sources of financial
instability and is routinely synthesised with research and
analysis in the Inflation Report and the Financial Stability
Report.  More generally, regular dialogue with market contacts
provides valuable insights into how markets function,
providing context for policy formulation, including the design
and evaluation of the Bank’s own market operations.  And the
Bank conducts occasional market surveys to gather additional
quantitative information on certain markets.
Based on intelligence of this kind, this section describes the
evolution of high-frequency trading in the foreign exchange
market.
High-frequency trading in foreign exchange markets
The foreign exchange (FX) market has evolved rapidly in recent
years.  Innovations in the use of technology have altered the
way transactions are initiated, executed, risk-managed and
settled, engendering a shift away from human to automated
computer management of those processes.  This section
describes one recent aspect of this evolution, namely the
emergence of so-called high-frequency trading (HFT).  The
remainder of this section explores how HFT in FX markets
evolved, the strategies and models employed and its potential
impact on the FX market.(1) In so doing, it draws on the
knowledge gained from the Bank’s participation in the
FX market and on intelligence gathered from discussions with
market contacts at banks, intermediaries, corporates and
HFT firms themselves.(2)
Automated trading
The transition in the FX market from a largely telephone-based
environment to electronic trading began in the early 1990s
with the emergence of the Reuters and Electronic Broking
Services interbank dealing platforms.  From around the turn of
the century, advances in technology allowed traditional
market makers (banks) to distribute FX prices with speed and
efficiency via new, electronic means to their clients and
end-users such as corporates and investors.  Technology also
helped standardise processes for communicating and settling
transactions, thereby improving efficiency.  These
developments led to higher trading volumes and attracted new
participants and dealing venues and enabled end-users to
transact on price terms much closer to those available in the
interbank market.
By 2005, market conditions were set for the proliferation of
automated trading among the majority of FX market
participants.  Banks were improving their automated
distribution of price quotes and began to automate further
their risk management processes.  Professional investors
utilised new tools to better execute trades and settle risks,
while corporates and, later, retail end-users all benefited from
the market’s ease of access and narrow bid-offer spreads.
These factors supported more ‘incremental’ trading:
participants transacting smaller sizes and at higher frequency.
The use of algorithms
Automated trading has allowed greater use of algorithms:
pre-programmed computer instructions that replicate a
manual process.  According to contacts, these algorithms can
serve a number of purposes.  This includes ensuring that orders
are executed at the best available price:  for example, banks
and others may use aggregators that combine multiple price
sources such that, when a manual trader deals, the algorithm
in the aggregator optimises the execution.  Similarly, large
investors may use algorithmic tools to transact large flows
automatically based on pre-selected parameters, for example
in order to avoid generating market volatility, using specified
time intervals to drip feed a large order into the market.  In
addition, contacts noted that banks may use algorithms in
models to offset risk by automatically dealing in the market.
High-frequency trading
Not all algorithmic traders are high-frequency traders, but the
business model of HFT firms means that HFT firms all use
algorithmic trading tools.
These firms focus on analysing large quantities of data, risking
their own capital in executing large numbers of low-value
transactions.  In so doing, even small profits on individual
trades will cumulate up given the volume of transactions.
Contacts report that HFT firms typically hold risk for a very
short time, frequently less than one second.  More recently,
however, some HFT firms have reportedly broadened their
activities, holding some risk beyond that timeframe.  As they
have done so, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish
trades generated by HFT firms from those originated by other
participants in the market.
All HFT firms use prime brokerage arrangements that are
usually provided by major banks.  This provides HFT firms with
direct access to a broad range of prices and counterparties.
These prime brokerage relationships also assist with the
typically high volume of trade confirmation and settlement
processes.
Contacts report that as these HFT firms emerged they quickly
employed sophisticated technology that enabled them to
trade faster than many of the larger incumbents.  This led to a
technology race in the wider FX market for sophistication,
efficiency and high speed (referred to as ‘low latency’).  For
example, contacts noted that with optimum connectivity,
including the appropriate location of hardware,
(1) For a discussion of high-frequency trading in equity markets, see Haldane, A (2011),
‘The race to zero’, available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech509.pdf.
(2) For a more detailed discussion, see BIS Markets Committee (2011), ‘High frequency
trading in the foreign exchange market’, available at www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.htm.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 291
communicating messages to trading venues can occur in less
than ten milliseconds.
The strategies employed by HFT firms are changing all the
time.  Early strategies were formed around so-called latency
arbitrage:  exploiting differences in prices among trading
venues that arose from differences in the speed with which
providers changed prices.  More recently, some contacts have
noted that trading models may take the form of correlation
trading, either within the FX market or across different asset
markets.  Some HFT firms reportedly also use statistical
arbitrage models that identify trading strategies based on
observed statistical relationships.  Contacts reported that
many firms routinely employ multiple models in parallel.
Some models are reported to require regular enhancements or
are even redundant in weeks or months.
Effects on market functioning
Within the market, views differ on the benefits of HFT activity
for the FX market as a whole.  According to some participants,
the presence of HFT firms leads to improved pricing — through
narrower bid-offer spreads — and better technology standards
across the industry.
There is debate, however, about the degree to which HFT firms
add liquidity to the market.  HFT firms can act as market
makers, thus providing liquidity, but some consider that
holding periods of less than one second mean that such
liquidity is illusory.  In particular, they note a risk that, in times
of market stress, HFT firms may withdraw from the market,
thereby aggravating any deterioration in liquidity.  Others
maintain, however, that in a fragmented marketplace such as
FX, HFT firms help to arbitrage away differences among
venues, playing a role in restoring equilibrium.  And, while HFT
firms may neither add nor subtract from liquidity, they can
increase the efficiency by which liquidity is transferred around
the FX system.
The emergence of HFT firms over the past five years is an
example of the rapid evolution of the FX market.  The Bank
continues to draw on its market intelligence contacts in order
to monitor developments in not only the HFT sector but also
in algorithmic trading more generally.